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Abstract
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) has potential for application in the new field of
telemedicine, as the use of radio waves offers advantages over traditional optical
technology such as bar codes. Radio waves are not limited by line of sight, they can
penetrate objects and communicate in a wireless fashion. However, the same advantage is
also the inherent weakness, as radio waves are susceptible to attack. Ongoing efforts
have identified forward secure chain hashing as a viable security protocol for RFID
authentication. Today’s typical RFID communications take place with the “host-readertag” arrangement where the computational requirements are performed by a back end
server system which holds all the intelligence and houses all records for an entire facility.
One server can easily utilize multiple readers, but a compromise of this single system
could have serious ramifications. Why not make a smaller system that is more robust and
tolerant of intrusion. This can be achieved by implementing a stand alone reader that
relies only on itself. We propose a server-less system that can accomplish the same
results. Because our enhanced reader does not require a server to perform its function, if
any readers are breached it only impacts that specific reader, not the entire server. By
eliminating the resource heavy server device, we can yield a more robust overall system.
We have selected a forward secure protocol to implement on an embedded platform that
will be able to authenticate a tag without the resources of a back end server.
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Chapter 1
1.1.

Introduction

Description

Many people have experienced the commercial use of encrypted RFID in today’s
commerce, such as the toll collection system “EZPass” or the “SpeedPass” payment
system by Exxon-Mobil.

SpeedPass uses the Digital Signature Transponder (DST)

manufactured by Texas Instruments (TI). DST is a cryptographically enabled passive
RFID device using a block cipher to implement a challenge-response authentication
scheme. Despite using a cipher text to exchange data with the reader, the fact remains
that the data interaction was performed on an open broadcast rendering the unprotected
tag vulnerable to any compatible reader. This authentication protocol was defeated in
2005 [5] with a TI evaluation kit.
The operational premise of RFID is based on wireless transmissions over open
radio waves, which is also the appeal for unauthorized access by an adversary.
Acknowledging the possibility of attack, we shall consider the wireless exchange as
compromised and include it in the development parameters. These parameters also
consider tag anonymity, the ability to prevent tag tracking, low cost of computational
resources, and means to keep previous information secure going forward. We explore
previous works that have successfully addressed these criteria. The work in [6] proposes
a matrix algorithm which is adaptable to the embedded platform, but passive tags lack the
ability to operate a timer as specified, while [3] proposes an XOR scheme sharing
random keys in a common list which require frequent overwriting of the complete list has
failed to maintain security when not updated by the users.
1

In [1], [21], Ohkuno et al. state the criterion for a secure system includes
indistinguishability, non- tracking, low-cost and forward-secure protocol. They propose
the use of a one way function to circumvent the adversary tampering and implement a
protocol that ensures the users privacy using a hash scheme. This method satisfies the
low cost requirement and is adaptable to RFID use.
Luo et al. build upon [1] by adding on mutual authentication protocol [2]. This
work describes how to make the tag output non-constant using a randomized key thereby
securing the data interaction between the reader and tag. Though the work is sound, [2]
needs to synchronize the reader and tag using a PRNG, which is cost prohibitive for
implementation on a low cost tag, therefore, was not considered for our implementation.
Of the work researched, [1] has the best approach for our proposed thesis. We
will implement an embedded system using an 8bit microcontroller as an alternative to the
traditional back end server that can be as effective in the RFID information exchange
while limiting the potential of wide scale data breach. The work in this thesis will
contribute to the security concerns stated by providing a lower cost alternative to the back
end server setup that is able to keep information previously sent from being revealed in
the future.

1.2.

Radio Frequency Identification
RFID has been in existence since WWII but was too costly to be considered for

widespread use in industry. In recent years the acronym has become more commonplace
and come forward to be an acceptable means of identification technology. As important
technology eventually does, RFID has found its way in to commerce and is being
2

integrated into many areas in various forms. One may be using RFID in daily activities
and not be aware of it. Libraries are using the technology for checkouts, shipping centers
are using the technology for package tracking or work environments use RFID in the
employee identification badges that grant building access to its personnel or perhaps a
major credit card is embedded with a RFID device that does not need to be swiped to
make a transaction.
In basic terms, RFID is a means to identify of one or more objects with the use of
radio frequency waves. To make use of RFID technology there are three essential
components required, these systems are discussed further in Section 2.1.

1.3.

Tags
Tags, sometimes called transponders, are simple integrated circuits combined

with an antenna that is tuned to receive a specific radio frequency and has the ability to
be programmed with data for identification. A tag will receive a carrier signal from the
reader and reflect a wave back to the reader encoded with the data requested. Tags
respond to signals from any device that provides the correct modulation and instruction.
Tag memory can be read-write, read-only or “write once, read many” (WORM).
Read-write tags have a serial number encoded that may not be modified and have
additional blocks of data to store information available to the end user. Read-only tags
have data programmed on them during the manufacturing process and can never be
modified. WORM tags can have a non-modifiable serial number written to them once
that is read numerous times.

3

Tags are available in a wide variety of form factors that range in size from the size
of a grain of rice to a standard sheet of paper. The most common frequencies are lowfrequency at around 125 KHz, high-frequency at 13.56 MHz and ultra-high-frequency at
860-960 MHz. Each frequency range has its advantages and is better suited for the
particular applications where they will be deployed.

Figure 1.1. Adhesive RFID label used in packaging industry (1.5 x 1.7 inches)

All tags can be generalized under two categories, active and passive, described in
the next sections.

1.3.1

Active tags
Active tags are powered with an internal battery to increase the effective

operating range and usually support features that passive systems do not, such as analog
sensors. Although the active tag is capable of greater range and additional functionality,
there are several disadvantages. One limitation is the larger physical size requirements,
and more importantly, its finite service life dictated by the battery and associated
maintenance costs.
4

1.3.2

Passive tags
Passive tags are more prevalent and use a coiled antenna to create a magnetic field

by capturing the readers radiated RF signal. The field is used to power up the tag
circuitry and respond to the reader. Since passive tags rely on the reader for their
operating power, they can potentially be held in service indefinitely. Passive tags are
generally small in size and have a lower cost compared to active tags.

1.4.

Readers
Readers, also known as interrogators, are transceiver devices that are used to

interface with the tags through the antenna. Chip manufactures have started to offer IC’s
that consolidate much of the analog circuitry making readers compact, easy to
incorporate and affordable. Readers are more of a relay device than a computing device;
they require an intelligent host to instruct them on their actions and to make use of the
data received from a tag. To retrieve the unique data on a tag, the tag must be scanned
and decoded by a reader.
Scanning is a process initiated by the reader emitting a radio frequency (RF)
signal that travels a short distance. When the tag passes through the electromagnetic field
of the antenna, it is activated and performs the function requested by the reader. The
radio waves backscattered from the tag are then converted to digital information by the
reader circuitry and processed accordingly. We will use a transponder, which is a passive
tag capable of read/write memory operations in the high frequency range.

5

1.5.

Telemedicine
Telemedicine is the use of use of communication technology for the delivery of

medical consultation or procedures at a distance. The appeal of telemedicine is that has
the ability to bring primary and specialty medical care into remote areas. The potential to
help patients who live hours from basic medical care services, and would otherwise not
be able to get to a medical facility, is enormous; it enables the patient to directly access
quality medical professionals without leaving their communities. Telemedicine is not
only restricted to patient use, medical specialists in off-site locations would be able to
provide consulting services to onsite staff.
One example of the applications for telemedicine is an assisted living facility.
The assisted living facility would benefit from promoting and offering virtual office visits
with medical professionals from the facility. This is good for the living facilities ability
to attract residents and increases the potential number of care sessions the resident could
receive without actually leaving the facility. There is no need for the patient to be
transported to the care giver and eliminates the logistics involved for the transportation.
The virtual visit can also reduce the stress for the patient. Perhaps the patient has a
condition that they wish to keep private as not to burden family members or they simply
want to keep their affairs to themselves. Or perhaps the care giver at the living facility is
a general practitioner or physicians assistant and needs to consult with a specialist; this
ability would greatly increases the care available to the residents.
Another example is telepharmacy services.

Telepharmacy can offer remote

pharmacist controlled dispensing systems. This ability can bring pharmacist counseling
6

to the point of care and provide real-time medication dispensing. Have you ever had a
prescription filled and not used the entire quantity? This could reduce the wasted product
and save money for both patient and provider. Telepharmacy could expand the service
area without the expense of traditional “brick and mortar” buildings and maximize staff
utilization. One pharmacist can serve many locations rather than one per building which
again saves money and resources.
Telemedicine enables the treatment process to begin much faster than traditional
care requiring the patient to travel sometimes long distances to be physically present at a
care facility.

1.6.

Challenges
Although technology forecasts better health care, advances in the field are not

without concerns. One major obstacle has been the issue of safeguarding the integrity,
security, and privacy of healthcare information that is transmitted and stored
electronically when using telemedicine services. There is a need for a reliable means of
ensuring patient confidentiality in the telemedicine data exchange. This shortcoming is a
primary concern when used in the context of telemedicine. A security gap exists in
identity verification when the patient is not physically present to confirm that the patient
is indeed who they claim to be.
Currently the method of disclosure in healthcare holds the patient identification
confidential, not the patient care information. Keeping with the practiced disclosure
method of the day, the focus here is on the security of the patient’s identity for which the
tag is issued, not the entire system from tag to server. This thesis investigates the reader7

to-tag information exchange and implements a light weight security protocol to safeguard
the patient’s identity.

1.7.

Overview

The aim of this thesis is to explore the use of an established hash function algorithm
suitable for service in a traditional server-reader-tag system and apply that concept to an
embedded system without loss of effectiveness.

Chapter 2, System Considerations,

discusses the various configurations possible for our proposed RFID system. Chapter 3,
System Design, discusses our selected system configuration.

Chapter 4, Security

Protocol, provides overview of what forward secure chain hashing is and reviews the
work done by [1][21] which is the basis of this thesis. It also discusses the selected
hashing algorithms and how our RFID tags are authenticated.

Chapter 5, Work

Environments, reviews the console application fshash, the embedded firmware, the user
interface SerialComm, and the respective development tools used. Chapter 6, Embedded
Code, presents a high level software state diagram for the firmware, the firmware, data
structures, and messaging formats. Chapter 7, Testing and Results, provides summary of
results for the range of operation, system performance results and cost of the system.
Chapter 8, Conclusion, summarizes the accomplishments of this work and provides
suggestions for future enhancements.

8

Chapter 2
2.1.

System Considerations

Typical RFID system
RFID systems deployed today have at minimum three components consisting of a

host, reader and tag. The host or back end server provides the intelligence of the system
and stores a data base of values that are associated with the tags for identification
purposes. The reader sends requests and demodulates responses and the tag is attached to
the object to be identified. There can be one or many readers configured for use with the
single host and there are many tags. The amount of information stored in the database is
only limited by the resources of the back end server.

`
Tag

Reader with
Antenna
Host

Figure 2.1 Basic RFID system in use today

The typical system is a good choice for non-critical applications such as the
packaging industry where it is not vital to conceal a customer’s shipping information, but
this arrangement is not well suited for our use in telemedicine where patient ID must be
hidden. In the next section, we will investigate a more appropriate setup for use with our
RFID system.
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2.2.

RFID system configuration options
We plan to implement a system that does not need the back end server a typical

system requires. To do this, we will use a microcontroller to provide the intelligence and
communications with the peripheral components. Most microcontrollers have a serial
communication port which will allow for interfacing with common devices.
The reader, tag and display make our system. The main component of our
system, the reader, consists of the microcontroller, a RFID module and an integrated
antenna. The tags are purchased read/write capable passive tags and there are several
choices of displays to receive the reader response. These three are the most common, but
this is not an exhaustive list. As shown in Figure 2.2, the display can be a computer that
is connected to the internet, wireless transmitters, or cell phones.

Essentially the

transmission to be received from the reader needs to have a path back to the user.

Figure 2.2 Transmission path options
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2.2.1

Cell phones
In order to use cell phones for display, there must be an adaptor from cell phone

to reader and platform specific software on the receiving cell phone. The microcontroller
can provide ASCII text to the reader side cell phone via a serial-to-USB device which can
then be forwarded to the user’s cell phone. The advantage of this is that there are many
cell phones currently in use and the physical location to call in or provide an office visit
can be almost anywhere. The communication medium offers great flexibility, however,
the disadvantage is that there must be cell service in the area. Of course there are satellite
service options available, but our application was targeted towards remote areas which
more often would not have such resources available.

2.2.2

Internet
To use the internet there must be a serial-to-Ethernet device on the reader to route

the packets to the user’s/care providers internet enabled display. These devices are
readily available as add on modules from many vendors and can be incorporated in to
existing designs easily as they use the same serial output from the microcontroller
without modifications. This capability would literally enable world wide deployment and
may possibly appeal more to the care provider than the patient. Similar to the cellular
service discussed previously, it implies that there must be an internet service provider and
access to the internet, which is not typically associated with the remote areas targeted.

11

2.2.3

Wireless transmitter
To use the transmitter there must be a means to forward the readers ASCII output,

ideally with a DB9 serial connection. This would be a simple device that could be
attached or interchanged with a different radio or possible mixed with radios of different
models. Radios do not need any specific connection services, as required cell phones or
the internet, and they provide a good option for service in remote areas. However, the
radio may be limited by the distance it can transmit or the geography of a region where it
is deployed.

2.2.4

Transmission encryption
It is possible to encrypt this transmission by selecting a microcontroller with a

built in encryption engine, such as the AVR® XMEGA series from Atmel®. These
devices have cryptography support for AES and DES. This would add another level of
security to the data exchanged and prevent attackers from obtaining the information. To
use this functionality, an appropriate utility must be used on the receiver side to correctly
decrypt the responses.

12

Chapter 3

System Design

From the several options and possible configurations we have shown, we have decided to
employ a system that uses a wireless radio. The interface to the radio is simple a DB9
connection and the radios do not require the additional overhead of specific software for
the internet or cell phone device. Also, the microcontroller we have selected does not
have an encryption engine; this decision was made because of the frequency hopping
operation of our chosen radio and inventory on hand.

Reader

`

Figure 3.1 Selected transmission configuration

3.1.

RFID reader
The reader is considered a single component, but it is comprised of several

components; a block diagram of the device is shown in Figure 3.2. The details for each
are listed in the Sections 3.1.4 through 3.1.3.

13

DB9

ATmega64

MAX232

RW-210

LEDs

Figure 3.2 RFID reader block diagram

Figure 3.3. Complete RFID reader device

3.1.1 ATmega64 microcontroller
The microcontroller is replacing the back-end server in the traditional RFID
system. This micro is capable of handling the same computational workload needed, but
14

is scaled down in its available memory.

We selected the Atmel® ATmega64

microprocessor [16] for our reader for the following attributes:


64k bytes of reprogrammable flash memory



4k bytes of SRAM



2k bytes of NV memory rated for 100,000 write/erase cycles



SPI interface for in-system programming



JTAG on-chip debug support



two dedicated programmable serial communication ports



software selectable clock frequency



programming lock for security



rated for 100 year data retention (normal ambient conditions)

In addition to the no-cost software development tool, the primary reason for
selecting this component was the anticipated size of firmware to be used. It was expected
that there would be need for a substantial of amount memory for the porting of the two
hashing algorithms used and a large amount of memory for text strings used in the host
communications. The chip comes in a 64pin TQFP package and readily available from
major distributors.

15

Figure 3.4. ATmega64 mounted on TQFP to DIP adaptor

Communications between the ATmega64 and RW-210 are not encrypted. This is
considered internal communications for the reader device and not exposed to the outside
world.

These communications take place on circuit board traces and are not sent

wirelessly, therefore they are considered secure.

3.1.2

LED visual indicators
There are four LED lights on the reader for the benefit of visual confirmation of

the various operations performed. The LEDs are controlled by the microcontroller, as the
code enters the different states.
LED0: Indicates PROGRAMMING MODE, this LED will light up and
remain lit until the patient ID and tag programming is completed.
This is the LED placed adjacent to the reset pushbutton.
LED1: Indicates when the reader is expecting a tag to be scanned, it will flash
once per second until a tag is scanned.

16

LED2: Indicates whether the tag authentication was successful. It will remain
lit for a one long second duration.
LED3: Indicates whether the tag authentication failed. It will remain lit for a
one second long duration.

LED 0

Figure 3.5. LED bank for visual aid

When the system is powered on, all four LEDs will flash in order (3 to 0, 0 to 3)
several times to indicate the system has been successful initialized and is ready for use.

3.1.3

Serial Converter
This is the one of the standard components used in industry for serial-to-TTL

conversions. This converter, a Maxim MAX233CPP, or any other converter, is required
for interfacing the reader with the outside world and in our configuration, the
SerialComm user interface running on our display. Given this communication is sent to
the outside world, it can be intercepted at this physical point in the circuit. This is the
portion that would benefit from the encryption engine that would be available on the
microcontroller.

17

3.1.4

RFID module
RW-210 RFID Reader/Writer from APSX [15] provides the interface

functionality for the ISO15693 tags we are using. The module requires TTL level inputs
and has an integral antenna that operates at a frequency of 13.56MHz. The baud rate for
this module is 19200bit per second and it has a read/write range that is a 4 inch radius
(cone shape).

Integrated antenna

Figure 3.6. RW-210 module

The wireless data exchange between the RW-210 and a tag is not encrypted and
therefore is susceptible to attack, however, the short range would make this very difficult
as the patient would be able to visually detect a sniffing device placed close enough to be
effective. Though the communication is wireless, we will assume that this is not a great
concern.

3.2.

RFID tag
The RI-TH1-CB1A tag from Texas Instruments [11] is an ISO 15963 compliant

device and is approximately the size of a standard credit card. It has a maximum storage

18

capacity of 64 blocks of raw data, where each block holds 32-bits for a total capacity of
2048 bits.

Each tag is assigned a 64-bit UID by the manufacturer at the time of

production, which may not be modified. The tags are readily available and have a cost of
a few dollars.

Figure 3.7. Tag memory structure
(Source: TI data sheet for RI-TH1-CB1A [11] )

3.3.

Wireless Radios
The wireless transmitters we selected are the HN-550. These are 2.4GHz wireless

data modems [24] and are ideal for this particular application, as they have a 9-pin serial
interface and are frequency hopping devices. This means that unless the hopping pattern
is known, the transmission can not be intercepted as a whole transmission, only portions
and thus offers a level of protection from an attack. Another desirable feature is that the
HN-550 is capable of point-to-point or point-to-multipoint networks making it possible to
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have multiple users in the same location without interference from one another or
increasing the transmission range by hopping the transmissions through multiple units.

Figure 3.8 HN-550 wireless radio

We have described what the key components of the system are, in the next
chapter we will focus on the specifics pertaining to security protocol we implemented.
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Chapter 4
4.1.

Security Protocol

Protocol selection
Several security protocols were examined and considered for implementation as

reviewed in Section 1.1. The driving factors for the selection of chain hashing are;


Light weight protocol



Protocol that can eventually be implemented on tag circuitry



Computations will be contained in limited resource microcontroller

A light weight algorithm, meaning an algorithm having less complexity in order
to reduce overhead, is needed to achieve the proposed goal. There are other approaches
to achieve secure communications, such as PRNG and block matrices. However, to
comply with the forward secure component, a PRNG would need to be synchronized
between reader and tag which would require additional circuitry and power. Block
matrices are not as strong as the forward secure cryptographic chaining hash.
Another factor is the tag itself. Although current technology has not done so at
the present time, this protocol must be able to be realized in to the tag circuitry. The
small size of the tag IC must be retained therefore the gate size must be kept as small as
possible. In [25] it was shown by using a 0.13μm CMOS standard cell library that the
SHA-1 circuit would be approximately 8k to 10k gates and the MD5 circuit would use
approximately 10k to 18k gates. These were gate counts for independent circuits; it may
be possible to combine common components to use fewer gates which may yield a
smaller unit cost as well as have small power requirements to carry out the necessary
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hashing operations.

The gate layout is not in the scope of our thesis and is not

investigated further.
The digest computation is to be entirely performed on the reader device which is
an 8-bit microcontroller. Microcontrollers are not designed like a back end severs nor do
they have commensurate resources, therefore the protocol must be straightforward yet
provide security at a sufficient level.

Another advantage, the cryptographic hashes

generate result of known length, this is valuable when using an 8-bit device with limited
memory storage capabilities.
Based on our needs and the extensive supporting research in [21], the decision to
use chaining hashes was made.

4.2.

Forward-secure chain hashing
Forward security is the confidentiality of previous messages, meaning that data

transmitted today shall remain secure in the future, such that even if the future message
contents are discovered, there is no way to correlate the current and future digests.
One potential method to achieving forward security is to use one of the
fundamental primitives in cryptography known as a hashing function, sometimes called a
“one-way” hashing function. The hashing function maps a bit string of arbitrary length,
known as a message, to a bit string of fixed length, called a digest, thereby preventing
unauthorized retrieval of the original bit string. The way this algorithm operates makes it
improbable to derive the message from the digest.
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Figure 4.1 Hash function

To take the one-way hash a step further, the algorithm can be applied successively
to a message, which is known as hash chaining. This method can easily produce multiple
one-time keys from a single message that are difficult to decode. Equation 1 shows
function h(x) which is a hash chain of length 3.

hhh x   h 3  x 

Equation 1

Reference [12] defines “A one-way hash function is a hash function that satisfies
the property that f(m) is “easy” to compute for all m  M, but for randomly chosen c in
the image of f, finding an m  M such that c = f(m) is computationally infeasible, namely
we can easily compute f, but it is computationally infeasible to compute f -1.”
In [1], Ohkubu, et al. propose using an initial message, si, apply hash chaining
and update the message for the next transaction.

Here the tag would store the

information, si , send the digest ai = G(si), and then renew its secret to si+1 = H(si) based
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on the previous message. Forward security is implemented by making use of two oneway hash functions, H and G, to calculate the digest.

Figure 4.2 RFID privacy scheme

This scheme provides the forward security we require. If ai is discovered, G is a
one-way hashing function, therefore si can not be revealed. H is also a one-way hashing
function, so if the tag contents are discovered, si can not be distinguished from si+1.
On the server, a database of tag identifications and messages, (ID, si), is
maintained. When the server receives the tag output, it will calculate the G(Hi(s1)) and
would verify the received digest matches the calculated digest.

4.3.

Protocol application
Our implementation does not require a back end server, and the computational

requirements of the protocol are contained in the reader’s microcontroller. The reader is
not intended to service a vast number of patients and because of that does not need to
have a large memory section.

The tag/patient database is to be stored in the
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microprocessors non-volatile memory so it can be retained through power cycles. The
one-way hash functions chosen were primarily with the digest length as criterion. We
selected the SHA-1 and MD5 functions to demonstrate the operation of the our chosen
algorithm, other functions, for example SHA-2 or the winner of the SHA-3 competition,
could be used in place of the SHA-1 to provide additional strength. The length of the
second function needed to be as short as possible while balancing encryption strength.
The first hash is done using the SHA-1 functions designed by the NSA [7],[8].
With a maximum message length of (264-1), the digest produced is 160-bits long. Our
input message is limited to 9 ASCII characters, but may be increased if warranted.

Figure 4.3 SHA-1 generation
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The second hash is done using the MD5 function [9] designed by R.L. Rivest
commonly used for file download integrity. MD5 produces a 128-bit digest in our
application and uses the SHA-1 digest as the input message. The shorter digest length of
16bytes was desired to maximize the number of digests to be programmed on a single
tag. If a different function is implemented in this part, the effect would be that the total
number of digests stored on the tag would be reduced as the tag memory is fixed.

Figure 4.4 MD5 block diagram

The tags are not capable of computation, only data storage; therefore, we can not
have a fully compatible system that is specified by [1] where the tag generates the digest
in real time when requested. In lieu of an intelligent tag, we will program and store the
MD5 digest on the tag to be scanned by the reader.

4.4.

Tag authentication process
The process of authentication begins with the programming of the reader. At the

time of commissioning, a tag is scanned to obtain its valid UID. After verifying the tag
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has not been entered previously, the patient ID number, message and number of hashing
iterations to chain are all entered in and stored to the reader’s microprocessor memory.
By allowing any length message, up to 9 characters, and an unknown number of
iterations to chain ranging from 16 to 133, the message will remain secure from
discovery.
The tag is only able to store 16 digests at any time, and to generate the digest data,
a separate console application called fshash is used. The fshash application requires the
same message and a number of iterations to generate the final 16 digests in the series of
hashes. These resulting 16 digests can be programmed on to the tag at any time using the
reader and GUI interface.
Once in service, the reader is remotely instructed via a RS232 serial port to
authenticate a tag and signals the patient to place the tag to be scanned. The identity of
the tag is checked against the entries in memory, and if the UID is not found, the process
ends. If the entry is present, the reader reads the stored values for the message and
number of iterations and calculates h(hn-1(message)) = hn(message). This is the digest we
are expecting to read on the tag. The reader then reads from memory the tag block
number that corresponds to the 16 digests on the tag, and issues a command to the read
tag memory contents of that location.
For example, we have entered the following:
Message: test
Iterations: 38
The application provides digests 22 through 38 and these are programmed on to
tag memory mapped as 22 → block1, 23 → block2, successively to 38 → block16. On
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request h(h(h36(test))) = digest iteration 36, a request for the contents of tag memory
block_14 is issued.

Table 4.1 Tag memory assignments

The reader compares the calculated digest with the one received from the tag. If
the information is a match, an LED validates the patient using the reader and a
confirmation text is sent to the remote user. Following the positive confirmation, the
iteration number and tag block numbers on the reader memory are decremented by one
and stored for the next authentication request.

The current digest (the digest just

authenticated) is updated with next digest in line for subsequent authentications. For
example, in Table 4.1 the last digest to be authenticated is h22(digest).

When a

authentication for h38(digest) is successfully completed, the digest is updated with
h21(digest), the next digest needed following the data in block_1. This complies with the
forward secure requirement to overwrite the digest that was immediately used.
If they do not match, an LED indicates the failure to the patient and a failure text
is sent to the remote user. In this case, the reader memory is unchanged. All of the
information exchanged is reported back to an authorized user via the RS232 serial port.
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Note that the serial exchange between reader and display is not encrypted for use in this
thesis, but can be implemented if desired.
We have explained the security protocol and how the authentication takes place,
in the next chapter we discuss the various software tools and interfaces to use the RFID
system.
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Chapter 5
5.1.

Work Environment

fshash
The console application, fshash, was written to assist in the tag digest

programming. The application prompts for a message that can be any value up to 9
characters in length. The reason for this is that initially the patient’s Social Security
Number was intended for use, however, any value may be assigned. The message entry
whether intended as numerical or text, is used as an ASCII value, so it is possible to have
control characters, such as LF (line feed), as a resulting value. To prevent this from
occurring, we have, for the purpose of this thesis, limited the range to 16 through 133.
ASCII value ‘z’ may have 133 increments before it will enter the control character
values.

Figure 5.1 Screenshot of fshash console application
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The SHA-1 and MD5 algorithms are publicly available and provided free of
charge on several web sites.

fshash will generate the digests we are interested in and

write three output files, one for the SHA-1 digests, two for the MD5 digests.
The SHA-1 file, named “sha1-out.txt”, was used to verify the hash results and
each digest is the input message for the following MD5 algorithm.

Figure 5.2. SHA-1 digest for message “Test”

The first MD5 file, “md5-out.txt”, is the entire digest as will be generated by the
reader. This file is intended as useful information for the user.
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Figure 5.3. MD5 digest for message “Test”

The second, md5-out-fmt.txt”, is a duplicate of the first with a delineating space
written between each byte of digest for programming purposes. The data must be entered
with this format to the interface application to program the tag. For convenience, it may
now be copy/paste as is in to the SerialComm GUI user interface.

Figure 5.4. Formatted MD5 results for digest “Test”
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fshash is written in the C language using the Code::Blocks ® open source
programming environment [19].

5.2.

Embedded firmware
The firmware for the microprocessor was written using AVRStudio4®, Atmel’s®

free Windows IDE using the GCC compiler [17]. All source code development and
debug was done using the AVR® JTAGICE mkII [18] from Atmel®, a development tool
for On-chip Debugging with IEEE 1149.1 compliant JTAG interface. Chapter 5 details
the primary components of the source code.

Figure 5.5. AVR® JTAGICE mkII

5.3.

SerialComm
The user interface for the system, SerialComm, is a basic serial communications

GUI application for use with the Windows operating system. This application is not
specifically required as the instructions to the reader are simple text and hexadecimal
inputs. The application was written using the C++ Builder 6 IDE from Borland®.
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Figure 5.6. SerialComm GUI

The lower left portion of the GUI is the host communication port selection
options. When the application is launched, it searches for available all communications
ports and presents only the active ports. The communications options, 38400bps, 8-N-1,
have been selected as shown in Figure 5.6. The settings may be saved for future use.
The text box located above the Transmit button is where all user selections are
entered. To send data, the user must click the Transmit button. When programming the
tag digest data, the Tag data check box must be selected, and this will send the data as
hexadecimal values.
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5.4.

Programming menu
The program option presents several selections. The user may choose to enter

new tags, edit or remove existing tags, or program tag digests individually, or all blocks
at once.

Figure 5.7. SerialComm programming options

To enter a new tag the user must enter the following:
a. Tag number which in our version can be between 1 and 10.
b. The 9 digit patient ID
c. The secret key (also called message)
d. Number of iterations which in our version can be between 16 and 133
All entries are confirmed after each entry is made.
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Figure 5.8. New tag entry

Once a tag is entered, it may be entirely removed or fields Patient ID, Secret Key
or Iterations may be updated. Each update is confirmed as it is made. The tag digest is
easily programmed. If the entire 16 blocks are selected, the user enters the data, checks
“Tag data” and clicks the Transmit button.

If single digests are selected, the user

indicates which block to program, specifies the single digest to program, checks “Tag
data” and clicks the Transmit button.
5.5.

Authentication
To authenticate a patient, the user selects the authenticate option, the reader will

indicate to the patient by flashing the LED and printing an asterisk every second on the
SerialComm window. Once the patient places the tag on the reader, the authentication
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initiates and indicates the results. The reader will indicate one of three possibilities, the
tag was not found in memory meaning it was never entered, authentication failed, or
authentication confirmed.

Figure 5.9 Authentication FAIL

Figure 5.10 Authentication CONFIRMED
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Having articulated the software environments and their use, the next chapter will
detail the RFID reader and tag at a system level.
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Chapter 6

Embedded Code

The embedded source code is loaded in to the microprocessor; this code dictates the
behavior of the reader device. The following sections illustrate the essential components
of the embedded code.

6.1.

State diagram
The RFID reader has the following normal operating states, READY,

PROGRAM, and AUTHENTICATE. The RESET can be initiated at any time and will
go the READY state. Transitions between states are governed by the following state
diagram.

START

RESET

READY

PROGRAM

AUTH

Figure 6.1 Reader state diagram
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6.2.

Program flow
The RFID reader system software is a repetitive cycle, the program flow is

described in the chart in Figure 6.2. The system waits at the ready state until the user
enters a request for action.

The authentication action follows through with tag

verification and returns to the ready state. The program action prompts for the user to
select what to program and then processes that request. After programming, the system
returns to the ready state.

6.3.

Firmware
The RFID reader system is governed by a small event driven real time operating

system.

The system has soft time requirements and is not life critical. The notable

attributes are discussed in the following sections.

6.3.1

Clock source
The reader circuit uses an external ceramic chip resonator at a frequency of

7.3728MHz.

This component was selected because the frequency (4×1.8432 MHz)

allows integer division to common to baud rates reducing the bit error rate in serial
communications. The resonator has built-in capacitors and needs only to be connected to
the XTAL1 (pin 24) and XTAL2 (pin 23) pins of the ATmega64 microcontroller. The
fuse settings must be set accordingly. Section 6.3.4 provides additional details.
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Figure 6.2 High level program flow chart
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6.3.2

Reset
The reader may be issued a hard reset by pressing the only pushbutton in the

circuit tied to the RESET pin.

This action is an “absolute jump” command, the

equivalent of cycling power on the reader. This will cause the system to begin execution
at instruction 0x0000 and reset all I/O resources on the ATmega64. A reset command
does not erase the contents of the NV memory.

6.3.3

JTAG
The ATmega64 is capable of JTAG interface, which allows for flash memory

programming and in-circuit debug.

This functionality is very important as the

ATmega64 is a SMT part meaning it is not easily removable. DIP components may be
removed by simply unplugging; this is not the case for SMT components. Once SMT
components are soldered in place there are a finite number of times the component can be
soldered and removed before the board pads are damaged. JTAG enables the embedded
software development to continue while the microcontroller is still installed in the circuit.
The modified code can be uploaded and tested as frequently as needed without the
removal of the microcontroller. Four pins of the ATmega64 in Port F (PF5 – PF7) are
required to attach the AVR® JTAGICE mkII to utilize the interface.

6.3.4

Fuse settings
The fuse settings are the configuration bits for the ATmega64 that allows the for

the set up of the various aspects of the microcontroller such as boot flash size, enable
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JTAG interface, the clock to run (external crystal, internal oscillator) and to save the
EEPROM memory contents on power cycles. To permanently lock the microcontroller,
the lock bits may be set, thereby preventing further access.

Figure 6.3 ATmega64 fuse settings

6.3.5

Communication ports
Two true dedicated serial communications ports are available in the ATmega64

microcontroller. One named USART0 is used for the host-reader communication, the
other named USART1 is for the module-reader communications. Setup for each is
shown in Table 6.1.
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PORT

LINE

DIRECTION INTERFACE

USART

BAUD

PE0

Rx

From

Host

0

38400

PE1

Tx

To

Host

0

38400

PD2

Rx

From

RW-210

1

19200

PD3

Tx

To

RW-210

1

19200

Table 6.1 ATmega64 data communications setup

The

hardware

USART1_Rx_vect,

interrupt

service

USART0_Tx_vect

routine

and

vectors,

USART0_Rx_vect,

USART1_Tx_vect,are

defined

in

“avr/iom64.h” to indicate the reader has just received a character or finished sending the
contents of the output buffer respectively. To transmit a message, we monitor the Tx
complete interrupt, which is set when the last byte is sent out. On the receive side, the Rx
complete interrupt is set when a single byte is received. To ensure that all serial data has
adequate time to buffer, 20ms software delays are used where needed. This allows
sufficient time for all packet bytes to be read in completely before any parsing is done.

6.4.

Data structures
The tag data relates to the patient and this is stored in a struct in the

microcontroller memory. The struct is shown in Figure 6.4. The information contains
everything required for the authentication process.
struct tag
{
BYTE uid[UID_LENGTH];
BYTE patient_id[P_ID_LENGTH];
BYTE key[KEY_LENGTH];
BYTE n_val;
BYTE next_dig_read;
BYTE next_dig_prog;
};
Figure 6.4 Tag-Patient data structure
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The first three struct members are set when the tag is commissioned and last three struct
members are updated on each tag authentication. This information will remain intact
between system power cycles. The struct is mirrored in the configuration registers.

6.4.1

Configuration registers

The RFID reader will have the following parameters stored in NV memory.
Register Number

Register name

Size

Description

0x00

uid

12

Unique ID

0x0C

patient_id

9

Patient’s ID

0x15

key

9

Input message

0x1E

n_val

1

Iteration number

0x1F

next_dig_read

1

Next digest to be read

0x20

next_dig_prog

1

Next digest to be programmed

Table 6.2 NV memory configuration register

uid
patient_id
key
n_val
next_dig_read
next_dig_read

unique identification number of the tag
patient’s ID assigned by the care facility
input message to be encrypted
iteration number for encryption
next digest to be read in authentication
next available tag block for programming
Figure 6.5 Configuration register definitions

There are 10 identical tag records allotted in our firmware, therefore each tag
entry record will be offset by 32 bytes. The ATmega64 can hold 2k bytes of data in NV
memory, giving a possibility of 60 tag records per reader if required. The total number of
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tag records that may be used is defined in our source code, it is not a feature modifiable
by the end user.

6.5.

Messaging formats
The following protocol format has been defined for the RFID reader to use in

communications with the RW-210 module. All messages between the reader and RW210 module must contain CRC bytes appended to the message.

6.5.1

CRC
The CRC-16 formatting is a basic XOR scheme using a “Preset Value” and a

“Polynomial”.

A number of bytes specified in the function parameters are processed in

the CRC calculation and, once determined, the 16-bit CRC is returned. The pseudo code
is shown in Figure 6.6.
Initialize the 16-bit remainder (CRC) to 0xFFFF
Loop:
XOR the 8-bit data byte with the CRC
Shift the CRC 1 bit to the right
Increment shift count
Is the bit shifted out to the right a 1 or a 0?
If 1, XOR CRC with generating polynomial
If 0, shift CRC right 1 bit
Repeat LOOP 7 more times
1’s complement CRC
Format CRC, swap high and low order bytes
Return CRC value
Figure 6.6 CRC pseudo code
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This CRC is appended to any data communication going to and coming from the RW-210
module.

6.5.2

Tag data programming
To program the tag, an instruction must be sent with the format in Figure 6.7.

The packet can hold 4-bytes of data. A digest is 16-bytes in length, therefore there are 4
separate packets required when programming a single digest. The full digest is parsed
into four parts, appended with the CRC, and sent to the RW-210 module for transmission
to the tag. The same function is used to program a single digest or the full 16 digests.
0

SOP

1

Bytes Exp

Flag

4

3

2

Block

Cmd

5

D1

6

D2

D3

9

8

7

D4

CRC1

10

CRC2

Figure 6.7 Write tag block message format

The individual bytes are defined as:
SOP
Bytes Exp
Flag
Block
Cmd
D1 – D4
CRC1
CRC2

Start Of Packet – indicates number of bytes in
complete packet following this byte
Number of bytes expected in reply
ISO15693 specific, sets option flag, data rate and
sub carrier
Tag block to write
ISO15693 tag instruction command
Data bytes 1 through 4
High byte of CRC
Low byte of CRC
Figure 6.8 Tag message definitions
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To generate the correct CRC bytes, the first two bytes of the write command are
excluded in the calculation. The format to forward to the CRC function is shown in
Figure 6.9.

0

SOP

1

Bytes Exp

4

Cmd

Block

Cmd

Block

5

6

D2

D1

4

3

2

Flag

3

2

Flag

5

D4

CRC1

6

10

CRC2

8

7

D2

D1

9

8

7

D3

D4

D3

Figure 6.9 CRC-16 format for tag block programming

After determining the CRC, the result must be appended as well as bytes 0 and 1, prior to
issuing the instruction.

6.5.3

Get UID

The UID may be requested from any tag by using one of two commands, the get_uid or
fast_uid. The get command is formatted as shown in Figure 6.10

0

SOP

1

Bytes Exp

3

2

Flag

Cmd

4

Blk Num

Figure 6.10 Get UID instruction
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5

CRC1

6

CRC2

The get UID frame bytes are:
SOP
Bytes Exp
Flag
Cmd
Blk Num
CRC1
CRC2

Start Of Packet - number of bytes following this byte
Number of response bytes
ISO15693 specific, sets option flag, data rate and
sub carrier
ISO15693 inventory command
Block number to read
High byte of CRC 16
Low bye of CRC16
Figure 6.11 get_UID message definitions

The 12 byte response is the tag ID with the two CRC bytes appended at the end. The
fast_uid command is 0xFA and it serves the same purpose as the get_uid command. The
advantages of this command are convenience and speed, and there are 6 less bytes to send
for each transmission. The response to fast_uid command is the same as the get_uid
command.
Having described the user interfaces, the system components, and firmware
operations in the previous chapters, we will deploy the system in our test environment
and review the results in the next chapter.

49

Chapter 7
7.1.

Testing and Results

Encryption results
Two hashing algorithms, SHA-1 and MD5, are used to produce the digest

encoded on each tag. The firmware digest produced was compared against a digest
produced using a freeware application called HashCalc [23].

Input message

Resulting digest

Figure 7.1 SHA-1 digest comparison

Using the input message “TEST” with 32 iterations of hashing, the digests are
shown in Figure 7.1.

Applying the iterations will update the message to the ASCII

string “TESt”. The last line in “sha1-out.txt” matches the value in HashCalc.
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Input message

Final digest

Figure 7.2 MD5 digest comparison

51

The file “md5-out.txt” shows the final digest for the input message (the digest
from SHA-1) “120b9b60d9eb0a0ef37cb334c9c37d213b34e24d”.

The values

generated by HashCalc and the firmware are shown in Figure 7.2. The MD5 result is the
final digest and is encoded on the tag at block 16.

7.2.

Scan range
Scanning range of a high frequency RFID tag is less than 3 meters per the

standard, however, this ideal and very dependant on the reader circuit parameters and
environment in which the system is deployed.

Figure 7.3 RFID read range
(Source: How to Cheat at Deploying and Securing RFID [20] )

The RW-210 module is capable of reading at a maximum range of 7 inches according to
the manufacturer [15]. When tested in an environment that has no metal or magnetic
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fields (e.g. computer speakers) in proximity of the tag or module antenna, we achieved a
scan distance of 3.5 inches. For our use in our deployment, this is acceptable. The
shorter distance is sufficient since our application is a patient that is deliberately passing
their officially issued tag across the reader antenna. An ancillary advantage is that the tag
may not be maliciously scanned at long distance by an attacker.

7.3.

System performance
The system was tested in a normal residential setting with average appliances and

services. There may be additional circumstances (i.e. medical equipment) that could
skew the results found here.
One of the HN-550 radios which we named the base was attached to the host PC
via a serial port and the second radio named the remote was attached to the reader. First
the radios were indoors, positioned 50 feet apart in a residential environment and worked
correctly with no perceivable time delays in transmission. Next the radios were tested
with one radio outside and the other indoors at a range of 100 feet, the system again
performed correctly with no perceivable time delays in transmission. The HN-550 data
sheet specifies a range of 1000 feet indoors, and, based on our testing, this range should
be feasible with greater ranges possible using multiple radios to hop the transmissions.

7.3.1

Computation time
Computation and response time are of importance in the use of the system, as it

must be able to confirm or deny patient identity in an expedient manner. After a tag is
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scanned, our reader can perform real-time dual hash calculations, query the tag block for
the digest, authenticate and display the results within a time frame of two seconds.
The longest operation is a response to the get_digest command. By examining the
data transfer rate of this exchange, we will obtain a benchmark time to compare against.
The communication rate between the microcontroller and RW-210 module is set at
19200bps. The get_digest instruction issued by the reader shown in Figure 7.4 is 8bytes
long (64bits), so the time required is as follows.

Figure 7.4 Get digest instruction

Instruction = 8bytes x 8bits = 64 bits
19200bps = 19.2 bits per millisecond
64 bits ÷ 19.2 = 3.33ms (ideal transfer rate)

We show that approximately 3ms is needed for the microcontroller to send the get
digest instruction to the RW-210 module. Once the instruction is sent, there is a 50ms
software delay inserted to allow for the tag response (the digest) to be buffered. The
response shown in Figure 7.5 is 19 bytes long so the time required is as follows.

Figure 7.5 Digest reply message
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Response = 19 bytes x 8bits = 152 bits
19200bps = 19.2 bits per millisecond
152 bits ÷ 19.2 = 7.91ms (ideal transfer rate)

We show that approximately 60ms is needed for the microcontroller to read the
digest data from the RW-210 module. The total time required to read a digest from the
tag would be:

3.33ms + 50ms + 7.91ms = 61.24 ms

Next we look at the GUI display message for an authentication that passes as this
is the longest single message sequence.

Figure 5.10 shows the display beginning with

“Calculated MD5 digest: ” and ending with the new line for the “system ready” prompt.
The reader to host communication is set at 38400bps and the required time is shown;

163 characters x 8bits per character = 1304 bits
38400bps = 38.4 bits per millisecond
1304 bits ÷ 38.4 = 33.9ms

We show that approximately 34ms is needed for the SerialComm application to
display the authentication status. The combined ideal communication times (62ms +
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34ms = 96ms) are less than one tenth (0.100) of a second. This value is consistent with
the actual test results we have observed.
This is comparable to the authorization time required when using an ATM
machine to access one’s bank account. This is for a reader attached to a wireless modem,
as described in Section 3.3 or local host compatible of RS-232 communication, however,
there may be an additional time delay if the data must be sent over the internet. The
internet routing calculations are not part of this thesis.

7.4.

System cost
Our reader is not a production ready device, it is a prototype made from

perforated substrate intended to be used for rough electronics work typically using
through-hole components and hand soldered wires. To be a consumer product, the reader
would require at minimum a dual layered printed circuit board (PCB) that has electrical
traces in place of the hand soldered wires and use surface mount technology (SMT)
components. The PCB cleans up the design and reduces the possibility of transient
signals. The SMT components can reduce the cost of production as it can be automated.
Also, certifications from the FCC and UL Labs are usually associated with a commercial
product and must be in compliance. The design and certification costs are one-time
expenses that would diminish when amortized over the production life of the product.
The cost of our prototype is shown in Table 7.1
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Component
ATmega64
MAX233CPE
LEDs and misc. passive components
RW-210 RFID module
Prototype board
QFP-to-DIP adaptor
Total

Cost
$12
$10
$15
$55
$ 4
$10
$106

Table 7.1 Prototype cost

The cost of a commercial system would also be dependant on the communication
features of this product. The most likely features would be an incorporated wireless radio
transmitter or an embedded Ethernet module to increase the range of deployment beyond
our testing configuration. Either option can be obtained as a daughter card and attached
to the microcontrollers serial communication pins.
A commercial version would not use the prototyping board or the DIP adaptor,
and the component costs would be much less when purchased in quantities of 1000 or
more. A commercial product will also need to be enclosed to protect the components and
require some form of retail packaging, which all adds to the product cost. If a deployed
system was to use the HN-550 wireless radio, the units are readily available at major
distributors and cost approximately $550 each. The radios were already in our inventory
and were not a cost factor for our system.
The benefit of our system is that a population of 60 people can be serviced with a
single reader. By utilizing this reader in lieu of a backend server, the maintenance costs
of a server with its associated cast are mitigated. Due to the fact that our reader can
interface with any RS-232 compatible device, there is no need for specific software. Our
test system used a wireless radio eliminates the need for a network Ethernet
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infrastructure, and may be deployed anywhere. Based on these criteria, it is reasonable to
say that our standalone reader would cost less than a dedicated backend server used in the
typical systems deployed today.
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Chapter 8
8.1.

Conclusion

Closing remarks
Telemedicine is slowly gaining favor and is being introduced into health care

facilities, but still faces criticism for security obstacles that need to be resolved. We
showed that despite current RFID tag technology not being capable of real time
encryption calculations, we can deploy a system that is able to conceal the patient’s
identity.
In this thesis we set out to investigate a means of ensuring the confidentiality of a
patient’s identity when using remote medical consultation referred to as telemedicine.
We intended to show that patient identity verification was viable with RFID and that a
typical backend server driven RFID system could be streamlined to perform the
verification without a server.
Our RFID system is uses dual chain hashing establishing forward security in the
authentication process between reader and tag.

The authentication process is

compartmentalized in the reader, and we do not require a back end server to provide the
intelligent query to the tag as typical systems do.

Our system communicates with any

device that has a standard RS232 serial communications port and basic serial
communications software eliminating the need for complex interfaces. Our system also
reduces the risk of a backend server compromise by limiting the patient roster to 60 or
less patients. In the event of a compromise, only the location to which the reader is
assigned is affected, not the entire care facility. In this thesis, we have demonstrated that
our embedded version of the RFID system is indeed viable and offers benefits to the
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current backend server based systems being commissioned in care facilities adopting
telemedicine.
8.2.

Areas for future research

There are several areas for future research and development.



The development of a computational tag would be a key addition to the proposed
RFID authentication system.

Computational capability would eliminate the

described method of digest storage on the tag, thereby making simultaneous real
time calculations possible on both reader and tag. That event will result in the
verification process being invulnerable to attacks. Even if the data exchange was
intercepted, the attacker would not be able to reverse the digest and discover the
message.



The integration of the Ethernet module or cell phone interface would give the
RFID verification system the ability to be deployed anywhere the respective
service is available.

That greatly increases the deployment possibilities in

modernized environments, but does not include all scenarios. The wireless radio
tested solves our specific dilemma. A system that is capable of all three mediums
would give the optimal deployment option, however the cost could be drastically
increased. An investigation to implement this robust device would be of interest.



Our system was intentionally developed to be capable of a simple interface so any
device could communicate with it.

The development of a comprehensive

software application with user interfaces for the care provider and patient would
make the system a better product offering.
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